All of existence is derived from Torah. This is why the Torah has the power to control reality and even to change and establish a new reality within the parameters of the world. * About tax payments and how the Rogatchover understood it. * The aguna about whom kosher witnesses testified that her husband died and why the Tzemach Tzedek did not permit her to remarry. * Presented for Shavuos – Z’man Mattan Toraseinu.
By Rabbi Yehoshua Neuhauser, Maggid Shiur in the Yeshiva G’dola Tomchei T’mimim in Ohr Yehuda
The grandson of the Rogatchover Gaon once showed his grandfather an itemized list of taxes that needed to be paid to the government. When the gaon examined the list which specified what the taxes were for, he said that some of them needed to be paid since that was fitting, according to Torah, and they were included in dina d’malchusa dina, we need to follow the law of the land. But some of the taxes did not need to be paid because according to Torah, they were unacceptable.
Amazingly, the government later informed him that there had been an error in the bill and only some of the taxes needed to be paid. It was precisely the ones that the Rogatchover said needed to be paid, according to Torah!
The Rebbe told this story, and it serves as an appropriate introduction to the subject of this article: the Torah establishes the reality of the world. However, first we need to clarify why it is that the Torah controls the world. Not only that, but where does the power of Torah come from to establish the reality of the world?
Let us look at the first Rashi in Torah. Over there, Rashi questions why the Torah begins with stories of creation, while the Torah should have begun with the mitzva of “this month is to you,” which is the first mitzva commanded to the Jewish people. According to the Rebbe’s approach, “B’Reishis” serves here as a substitute for the mitzva of Kiddush HaChodesh, and thus there has to be some substantive connection between them. Indeed, it is specifically this mitzva which expresses the power of Torah to establish the reality of the world, to sanctify time.
The answer to Rashi’s question is that since the creation of the world was “B’Reishis” – for the sake of Torah that is called “reishis” and for the sake of the Jewish people who are called “reishis” – it perforce operates according to the laws of the Torah which are established by the Jewish people. Therefore, when according to Torah nature is supposed to be a certain way, then this is the way it will be because its entire raison d’être is derived from Torah.
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The Torah effects the world on two levels. The first is the impact of the prohibitions of the Torah on the world. This is a level that is not perceived by the physical senses; it is spiritual and not visible to the eye, but nevertheless the effects are experienced. When a talmid chacham is involved in Torah and judges something to be forbidden or permissible, the p’sak din effects the item and changes it from one state to the other.
The following example illustrates this. The din regarding an ox that gored one time, a shor tam, is that the payment of half the damages is exacted from the body of the ox. R’ Yishmoel and R’ Akiva differ as to whether the p’sak of the Torah is simply a ruling that requires additional action to transfer ownership of the ox from the “damager” to the “damaged” (Yusham HaShor – its value has to be assessed and then payment transferred), or whether the ox automatically transfers to the possession of the owner of the “damaged” goods the moment it gores, because according to Halacha he is supposed to receive half the damages (Yuchlat HaShor – ownership transfers automatically and then it is assessed to see if the “damager” is due a refund). This latter opinion is somewhat novel, since generally in order to enact a transfer of ownership some act of acquisition (kinyan) is required. Here though, we are saying that the very p’sak of the Torah causes the kinyan – the ox is already the property of the “damaged” and nothing remains to be done but to execute the technical aspect of it and hand over the ox (which belongs to him already).
The second level is much more tangible. On this second level, a change in the physical reality of the world, according to Piskei Torah, is experienced. Here is an example:
Chazal say that the Rosh HaShana for trees falls out on 15 Shvat. Since there is no explicit source for this in the Torah, we can say that this date is “Halacha L’Moshe M’Sinai,” established by Hashem and transmitted by the rabbis throughout the generations. However, the Rebbe proves through analysis of the wording of the Gemara that the date for the Rosh HaShana for trees was established by sevaros (logical reasoning) and that the Torah gives the chachomim the ability to do this.
From here we see that the Torah effects nature. How so? The Rosh HaShana for trees is when the fruit buds, the time when the blossoms fall off and the fruit begins to emerge, an utterly natural phenomenon. How can a fixed time for this be designated (especially according to the lunar calendar)? If we were to say that this date was designated in the Torah, then that would be one thing. However, if we assume that the establishment of this date was given over to the chachomim, the question is how can a natural phenomenon be established by Torah P’sak?!
However, this is the power of a din in Torah. If there is a P’sak Din according to Torah which rules that the Rosh HaShana for trees is supposed to occur on a certain date, then it will fall on that date and that is when the trees will bud!
But there is an even higher level in which a p’sak din transcends the reality of the world and ignores what already appears to be an existing reality. Generally, a person is unable to deny reality and say that that which he witnessed did not happen, but with the power of Torah one can ignore an existing reality and establish a new reality.
The Rambam says that we are commanded to decide matters based on two witnesses, even though we do not know whether they testified truthfully or falsely. The Acharonim have already stated that according to this, the laws of testimony are a gezeiras ha’kasuv (scriptural decree) and there is no necessity to say that whatever they testified to actually happened.
The Rebbe says that here we can see how the Torah is that which establishes what the reality is, even as opposed to the reality that we see. When the Torah says that we need to consider the testimony of witnesses, even in such a case where witnesses testify to an event that did not happen, this does not mean that the Torah is saying to adjudicate based on their words despite the fact that it did not happen. Rather, the Torah is saying it actually happened! So there is the reality of the world, in and of itself, and the reality of the world after the Torah dictates what it is.
The Rebbe similarly comments on the following verse, “Do not veer from what they [the rabbis] tell you, right and left.” The Chazal explain this to mean, “Even if they tell you that right is left and left is right.” By the Chachmei HaTorah saying that left is right, it becomes right because the Torah decides that despite the fact that the Torah itself calls it left, it gives the chachomim the ability, through their P’sak Halacha, to change left to right! The Rebbe even says that it doesn’t mean just the Torah sense of right and left, but actual right and left. When the chachomim issue a ruling on a matter of actual reality that is different than the reality we experience, they need to be obeyed since this P’sak changes reality.
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On to another, deeper point in this subject of the Torah’s influence on the world:
The Rebbe explains that the arguments between Beis Shammai and Beis Hillel actually share a common denominator. The general basis for their differing views is whether we follow the “potential” or the “actual.” Let’s take the disagreement about lighting the Chanuka menorah to commemorate the miracle of the oil. Do we light eight lights the first night and then diminish each night, or do we light one light the first night and add one each night?
According to Beis Shammai, on the first day, the jar of oil miraculously contained enough oil for eight nights (as it later turned out), so when lighting the menorah to recall the miracle, we consider the potential: on the first day, we have eight days of lighting ahead of us and that will be the number of lights we have. On the second day, we have seven days of lighting ahead of us and so we light seven, and so on. Beis Hillel says that we need to consider what we actually have right now; so on the first night we light one light, two on the second night, and so on.
The two perspectives derive from the need to reconcile the Torah and the reality of the world. As far as the world is concerned, the main thing is what is practical and the relevant point is what is actually happening and not what might happen. That which is in potential form is not significant to created beings in this world, for who can guarantee that it will move from the potential to the actual? However, when speaking in terms of the Torah, of course the potential will be actualized. Furthermore, within the potential itself the thing is actually there already.
According to this, it is not understood why Beis Shammai maintain their position, since the subject of their disagreements is the fulfillment of mitzvos in this physical world which establishes what takes place. How does a future “potential” get involved here?
But that is the point. Torah controls the reality of the world. Just like the Torah has the ability to change the reality of the world, it also has the ability to change its parameters. So although from the perspective of the world the “actual” is the determining factor, the Torah maintains that the “potential” is the determining factor. The p’sak is carried out within the world itself and changes it. These two perspectives are expressed in all matters of Torah and mitzvos just like the issue of lights on Chanuka.
The Rebbe once told this following extraordinary story. An aguna came to the Tzemach Tzedek. Kosher witnesses testified that her husband had died. According to the Halacha, the Tzemach Tzedek should have declared that the woman could remarry, and yet he said she should wait a while longer. After some time, her husband returned alive.
When it comes to a P’sak Halacha, the one and only thing to consider is the Halacha; ruach ha’kodesh plays no role in a p’sak din. There is even the other story about the Tzemach Tzedek in which a severe punishment was paskened for a woman who behaved unacceptably. There was a tzaddik, great in Nigleh and Nistar, who said he did not see the impression of sin on her forehead. The Tzemach Tzedek said about this that apparently the sin had been erased by the tears of her t’shuva, but since according to Torah it had been decided that the woman had sinned, that was certainly the case.
The question arises then: since witnesses had come and testified that the woman’s husband had died, according to Halacha the woman was permitted to remarry. Why did the Tzemach Tzedek’s ruach ha’kodesh play a role here so that he asked her to wait?
The Rebbe says that the Tzemach Tzedek explained it thus: the Torah establishes the reality of the world so that even if the husband was no longer alive, if they paskened that she was permitted to remarry, he would have died! (However, by delaying the issuing of his ruling, the matter was able to be resolved without the man having to die.)