THE USURIOUS PARENT

Selected Halachos from the “One Minute Halacha” project

By HaRav Yosef Yeshaya Braun, Shlita,
Mara D’asra and member of the Badatz of Crown Heights

T’FILLA AND ITS MEDITATIONS

T’fillos have varied sources and differing objectives; our emotional state should always be in sync with the t’filla that we are reciting. This knowledge will help us articulate our t’fillos with the proper kavana (focused intent):

When reciting birchas ha’Torah (the blessing on the giving of the Torah) as part of the morning brachos, we should be conscious of the fact that Torah is “k’li chemdaso shel HaKadosh Baruch Hu” (Hashem’s precious vessel), in which He takes delight every day. Therefore, we are to imbue its recitation with simcha (joy), conveying more pleasure than when saying any bracha for things that bring us physical pleasure. In this way we express our great good fortune in having merited receiving the Torah from Hashem.

The t’filla of Baruch She’amar is ascribed to a note that descended from Heaven imprinted with the words of this t’filla. It is described as a shir naeh ve’nechmad” (a pleasant and delightful song). As such, we are told to intone the words with ne’imah (sweetness) and niggun (a tune) to relay the uniqueness of their source.

Mizmor L’Sodah, directly after Baruch She’amar, is a shir (hymn) that also calls for an especially sweet and joyful expression. “Yeish limshoch oso b’neginah” (It is appropriate recite it slowly, and with a tune). When Moshiach comes, we are told, all previous shiros will be nullified, except this particular one which lauds the daily sacrifice of the Todah (thanksgiving offering in the Temple).

The reading of P’sukei D’Zimra should be enunciated word for word. These verses of praise for Hashem should not be rushed—we are to visualize ourselves in front of the King to whom we offer tribute before asking for our needs (and it would be particularly bad manners to acclaim Him in a hurry as a preface to stating our requests).

Krias Shma should be recited like the edict of a king in whose honor the entire nation rises and heeds, and every word should be spoken b’kavanah, b’eimah uv’yirah uv’resses uv’zeiah (with concentrated intent, with awe, fear, trembling and quaking). It should be proclaimed with the excitement of a new edict, for the Torah says, “Asher Anochi metzavecha hayom” (Which I command you today, i.e. it should be as precious to us as if it were commanded to us this very day). It should be noted that we are not actually required to stand for the Shma, since the pasuk states “U’velechtecha va’derech—k’edarko” (in your customary manner, even when you are sitting or traveling.)

When we recite the words of davening, we should do so k’moneh ma’os (as one who is counting money). The words should all be “counted”—each “coin” or “bill” handled individually and with appreciation, without skipping a single one. It is said of some tzaddikim (holy individuals) who davened quickly that they we like money-changers, whose bills are counted in stacks, since the quality of their t’fillos are on a completely different plane than those of the common person.

Our davening should also not present as k’vah (habit)—a burden that must be fulfilled and then swiftly dispensed of, but should feature the concern of the destitute begging for better opportunity—with rachamim v’tachanunim ([requesting for] mercy and with supplication).

IS BEING FIRED IN FURY FOREVER?

The halachos of mechilah (lit., forgiving, i.e., absolving someone from an obligation) do not entail a kinyan (act of acquisition) as do most other transactions; verbalizing intent suffices.

An employer who said to a worker “lech me’imadi” (“Depart from me!”) can have no complaints against the employee for quitting, nor for the resultant losses—of work and of money—even if the entire salary had been prepaid, since the employer voiced mechilah of their work contract. Two witnesses are needed for the mechilah to be binding if the dismissal is in dispute.

However, if a melamed (Torah teacher) was fired and left (even with a written mechilah, according to most poskim), he can be compelled to return to his post. A melamed is duty-bound to his students in addition to the (now defunct) obligation to the parents, unlike any other employer/employee relationship. (There are some exemptions to this arrangement for the teacher’s reinstatement: if another melamed is immediately available or if the melamed was fired for incompetence. If the melamed isn’t employed by the parents, but through a third party—and this applies today in a school or yeshiva environment—this halacha may not apply.)

A mechilah b’ka’as (release from an obligation made in anger) can be retracted if the employer regrets his reaction in the heat of the moment. Some poskim disagree, and maintain that the irate boss is bound to the sacking statement. However, the mechilah is valid only if the firing was obviously made with intent (as opposed to mere bluster), such as if it was said in the presence of witnesses or if it took place in front of a Beis Din.

The ticked-off taxi-driver who yells (over the screech of tires) to a recalcitrant passenger, “Get out of my cab and take your fare with you!” is not considered to have conferred true mechilah and the fare must be paid.

A MATTER OF INTEREST: THE TWO-FOR-ONE TRADE

The little girl is crying inconsolably, frustrated in her attempts to win a candy from her elder brother’s stash. Their father tries to intervene and make peace (and give the whole family a rest from here piercing screams!): “Teiere kind (my dear child),” he whispers to his seven year old son, “Give your little sister a candy. Tomorrow, iy’H, I’ll buy you two in return.”

The Gemara’s warning is recounted in halacha: A person should not lend or borrow from their family members or children with ribbis (interest), “Dilma asi l’misrach” (lest they habituate themselves [to this practice]) chas v’shalom. Assuming the candy belongs to his son, and the father borrows it from him to give it to his sister, the payback of two candies would be a form of ribbis.

It can be argued that the candy does not belong to the seven-year-old in the first place; a child, and certainly a minor, who is samuch al shulchan aviv (lit. trans. leans on his father’s table, i.e., is supported by his parents) doesn’t own anything outright,* and therefore the father is not actually borrowing the candy from his son, and the two replacements are not repayment of a loan, since all the candy belongs exclusively to the parent—so how can ribbis be involved?

Even if the candy that had been gifted to the older sibling is determined halachically to belong to the father, parents should not make such deals with their children. This is precisely what Chazal forbid: giving children a ta’am ribbis (any whiff of interest), dilma asi l’misrach.

An appropriate course of action would be for the father to buy the candy from the seven year old for the price of two candies, and pay him right away. Alternatively, he can turn this into an opportunity for a learning experience by saying to his son, “Please lend a candy to your little sister and Tatty will pay you back, plus an extra candy just for you.” This way, the loan is made to the sister and the father pays the interest as a non-brokered third party. When ribbis is paid from someone other than the borrower, it is permitted, so long as the borrower doesn’t state “so-and-so will pay you on my behalf” and the third party pays the extra as a gift without expectation of reimbursement from the borrower.

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